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Abstract 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPS) are public policies put into effect to help alleviate the harmful 
consequences of air pollution. Every state has a unique form of standards corresponding to their natural resources. 
More states have implemented the policy to increase the generation of renewable energy; however, many stand 
opposed to the policy in fear that it will increase electricity prices. The influence that RPS has on the price of 
electricity is not entirely understood. Previous literature confirms that RPS, on average, increases prices by three 
percent. This paper focuses on analyzing the effect of RPS on electricity rates over a longer period. Furthermore, 
it incorporates the effect of various forms of energy deregulation across state energy markets. Results confirm 
that RPS does increase electricity rates in states with regulated energy markets; however, the implementation of 
retail choice and wholesale market access reverses these findings and decreases electricity prices overall. 
Individuals across the country will be able to make a more informed decision on public policies related renewable 
energy with this analysis. 
 
Keywords: Renewable energy, Sustainability, Renewable portfolio standards, Electricity prices, Deregulation, 
Public policy 
 
Renewable Portfolio Standards (also known as 
RPS) are an example of a command-and-control 
regulation implemented throughout many US states. 
An RPS is defined as a “requirement on retail electric 
suppliers to supply a minimum percentage or amount 
of its retail load with eligible sources of renewable 
energy” (Barbose, 2017, p. 5). Each state has its own 
unique RPS that affects different types of electric 
utilities and has different compliance requirements. By 
2017, twenty-nine states and Washington D.C. have 
implemented RPS regulations in order to diversify 
energy sources, promote innovation and economic 
development, and reduce emissions (National 
Conference of State Legislatures [NCSL], 2018). Eight 
other states have implemented a “voluntary” renewable 
energy standard, or target that is not legally binding 
(NCSL, 2018). These states are represented by a lighter 
green color in Figure 1, and will not be incorporated 
into the analysis while the grey states have neither an 
RPS nor renewable energy target.  
Deregulation is characterized in a few different 
ways. If electric utilities have access to wholesale 
markets, they may be able to decrease retail prices. 
This is one way a state may allow for deregulation; the 
other option is to permit retail choice within the state. 
Retail choice allows consumers to select any provider 
for their electricity; without it, there is a monopoly on 
electricity. Craig and Savage (2013) define full 
competition as having access to both wholesale and 
retail choice within a state. This paper examines all 
three types of deregulation, retail choice, access to 
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wholesale markets, or both-full competition, as a form 
of deregulation in its analysis. 
Of the twenty-nine states that have an RPS 
mandate, fifteen of them have a fully deregulated 
electricity market. These states include: California, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Massachusetts, 
Maryland, Maine, Michigan, New Hampshire, New 
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
and Texas (Zummo, 2018). The exact year of 
deregulation for each of the following states’ energy 
markets, along with the years that they adopted RPS 
can be seen in Table 1. Some states, such as Virginia, 
have a deregulated market and no RPS, while states 
like Nevada have an RPS with a regulated market. This 
provides the data set a wide range of variability in its 
sample size. 
Sustainability is a rising issue that public policy 
makers and individuals are starting to care more about 
in recent years. This behavior encourages the 
implementation of policies that help promote the use of 
renewable energy sources over conventional fossil fuel 
substitutes within states. However, the progression of 
these policies is hindered if the public is discouraged 
by increasing prices. Every state designs its own set of 
RPS laws specific to its desired goals. The Database of 
State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency displays 
the RPS policies paired with its state on the map in 
Figure 2. More states may adopt the policy if made 
aware of the costs and benefits.  
The regulation of electricity in some states may 
be slowing down sustainability measures, and the 
unknown effects of deregulating the market has made 
citizens in states such as Nevada uncertain on how to 
vote on ballot initiatives in its 2018 midterm elections. 
Nevada’s energy market is monopolized by one 
provider, NV Energy. The 2018 midterm ballot 
questions asked citizens to vote on deregulating the 
state’s energy markets and increasing the state’s RPS 
requirement from 25% by 2025 to 50% by 2030 (Clark 
County Elections Department, 2018).1  The New York 
Times (2018) presents the results from the election to 
be “no” for a deregulated energy market and “yes” to 
an increased RPS initiative. The effects of voting “no” 
to deregulation is unknown when looking into what is 
 
1  Full questions can be retrieved from: 
https://www.clarkcountynv.gov/election/Pages/2018_QuestsGen.
aspx 
best for citizens in Nevada in regards to electricity 
prices. Nevada, however, is only one example of a state 
with a regulated electricity market and an RPS 
initiative.   
This paper attempts to analyze what impact an 
RPS will have on electricity prices in states with a 
deregulated electricity market. Using a panel data set, 
data are collected from utilities across all fifty states 
dated from 1990 to 2017. There is a challenge when 
estimating data from states with an RPS and non-RPS 
states. Tra (2015) explains that electric utilities in RPS 
states have unobservable differences from those in 
other states, resulting in variations of electricity rates. 
This references how states with RPS have more 
renewable energy potential due to the prominent 
sunlight, wind, dams, etc. These unobserved 
differences might produce biased estimates when 
running an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
(Tra, 2015).  
Characteristics of an RPS: States adopting the 
Renewable Portfolio Standard mandate have goals that 
vary depending on geographic location and renewable 
energy availability. Neimeyer et al. (2009) explains 
that each state RPS is characterized differently 
depending on (1) eligible technologies, (2) the 
percentage generation/capacity requirements from 
renewable sources overtime, (3) special treatment of 
individual technologies, (4) the presence and level of 
an alternative compliance payment (ACP), and (5) 
credit multipliers for certain resources or geographies. 
The type of electric utilities affected by the RPS 
standard also vary per state. Affected utility ownership 
types include municipalities, cooperatives, and/or 
investor-owned companies. Some states have a more 
aggressive RPS program because of their access to 
low-cost renewable resources (Neimeyer et al., 2009). 
Lower costs allow those states to have a higher 
percentage generation capacity given a certain period 
of time because renewable energy resources are widely 
available. For example, Nevada’s solar power potential 
makes it easier/more practical for the state to 
 
EFFECTS OF RPS AND DEREGULATION ON ENERGY MARKETS 
 
 
Spectra Undergraduate Research Journal – 2021 – Volume 1, Issue 1 
3 
implement solar panels when compared to states like 
Alaska. 
An RPS is a binding regulation which requires 
states to implement ways to enforce it. It is a form of a 
command-and-control policy that is unlikely to result 
naturally through market competition. Grossman and 
Cole (1999) explain how many believe that command-
and-control policies are less efficient or completely 
inefficient because they produce a greater social cost 
than benefit. RPS mandates are more expensive to 
impose on certain utilities, so states must ensure that 
utilities will comply with the standard. States do this 
by having mandates backed by a penalty. Tra (2015) 
explains the three options a utility has in order to 
comply with a states’ RPS mandate: (1) own a facility 
that uses approved renewable energy sources to 
produce electricity, (2) purchase electricity from a 
renewable energy facility, and (3) purchase Renewable 
Energy Credits (RECs).2 In some states, a utility that 
does not meet the goal set by the state is subjected to a 
penalty known as an alternative compliance payment 
(ACP) (Solar Energy Industry Association (SEIA), 
2013). If an electric utility does not comply, it will be 
forced to pay the compliance fee. The Solar Energy 
Industry Association (2013) mentions that utilities may 
also purchase RECs that can be traded to meet a state’s 
RPS. The REC prices are based on ACP rates and 
current/expected supply-demand balance, which 
makes them volatile and sensitive to changes in 
eligibility rules (Barbose, 2017). Since every RPS 
mandate is different, state characteristics play a role in 
defining why specific standards and rules for an RPS 
are created.   
Characteristics of Deregulation: Energy deregulation 
is a broad term that can be defined in different ways. 
Energy markets are supplied by vertically-integrated 
utilities that monopolized energy generation within 
their geographic area (Craig & Savage, 2013). 
Recently, some of these markets are being restructured 
to allow for market competition amongst utilities. 
Wholesale electricity sales are allowed in some states 
as well, regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC). Market restructuring began with 
the Federal Energy Policy Act of 1992 and FERC 
Order No. 888 in 1996 (Craig & Savage, 2013). The 
 
2 Approved renewable energy sources can be found by state at: 
http://programs.dsireusa.org/system/program 
Federal Energy Act created wholesale generators that 
sell and generate electricity at the wholesale level, and 
they provided FERC the ability to grant power-
producers the use of transmission lines from any entity 
to provide electricity to wholesale customers. States 
were also exposed to retail competition that allowed 
consumers to buy electricity from different retailers. 
Craig and Savage (2013) explain that the competitive 
wholesale and retail forces are supposed to 
incentivize  managers to increase efficiency and 
become more innovative to decrease their costs. As 
previously stated, the estimator will classify 
deregulation as either accessibility to retail choice, 
wholesale markets, or both.  
When it comes to the various ownership types 
in the analysis, cooperatives and municipalities are less 
likely to be exposed to, or affected by, deregulation in 
states that have allowed for it. Nueces Electric 
Cooperative (2018) distinguishes the three different 
utility ownership types. They define an investor-owned 
utility as a business organization that provides a 
product or service as a utility but is also managed as a 
private enterprise. Municipalities are run by city 
governments that are responsible for providing the 
utility-related service; Cooperatives, located in rural 
areas, belong to the people they serve and also share 
excess revenue with those people (Nueces Electric 
Cooperative, 2018). In the state of Texas, 
municipalities and cooperatives are exempt from 
deregulation and have the right to choose to participate 
in the retail electric market if they vote to. The Public 
Utility Commission of Texas (2019) states that 
although customers of municipalities and cooperatives 
do not have an actual role in managing their utility, 
they can elect the people that run them and voice their 
opinion. Cooperatives and municipalities, however, 
may have no motive to switch to a deregulated market 
since free market competition may not greatly benefit 
them. This is because cooperatives are run by the 
people who are a part of them, and municipalities are 
publicly owned; thus, the effect of deregulation may 
not be accurately predicted for these ownership types. 
For this reason, the analysis will focus primarily on 
deregulation’s effect on investor-owned utilities.  
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Literature Review: There are concerns regarding the 
efficiency and costliness of an RPS. The first RPS 
mandate dates back to 1983 in Iowa (Barbose, 2017). 
The purpose of this mandate is to increase renewable 
energy sources used by each state to help reverse the 
effects of climate change. However, even with these 
new initiatives, there have been no major 
improvements with emission trends based on the most 
recent data, and nations are adopting minimal policies 
in an attempt to slow the effects of climate change 
(Nordhaus, 2018). Opponents of RPS standards believe 
the policy is ineffective in reducing emissions because 
the mandate is not universally applied across the states, 
does not address externalities directly, specifies a 
technology instead of emissions performance, and 
applies uniquely to one sector (Montgomery, 2005). 
Even though these inefficiencies occur, there are 
benefits from implementing the policy. Barbose et al. 
(2016) state that carbon dioxide was cut by 59 million 
metric tons (worth about $2.2 billion), $5.2 billion was 
provided in health and environmental benefits, water 
withdrawals and consumption were reduced, and 
200,000 gross domestic jobs were supported in 2013.  
An RPS is known to be a more expensive way 
to lower emissions, but it is important to know by 
exactly how much the mandate would cost through 
increased electricity prices and who would be the most 
affected. RPS standards are shown to be about twice as 
costly in reducing greenhouse gases (GHG) than other 
sources, and renewable energy may be hard to procure 
with the restrictions that some state RPS mandates 
impose on firms (Lyon and Mayo, 2010). Tra (2015) 
estimated that utilities subjected to an RPS that serve 
the residential and commercial sectors have increases 
in electricity prices by 3 percent.  
A contributing factor to these price changes 
associated with an RPS could be the deregulation of 
state energy markets. Many states with some form of 
deregulation have also adopted an RPS.3 However, a 
little more than half of states with an RPS do not have 
full deregulation (both wholesale access and retail 
choice). This variation will help provide clear results 
 
3See Table 1 for a list of states and the years they adopted an 
RPS and types of deregulation 





Data: The data used for this empirical analysis is 
retrieved from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) and the Database of State 
Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE). 
The EIA (2018) provides the revenue, sales, and 
customer count of electric utilities from 1990-2017 
separated by residential, commercial, industrial, 
transportation, and “other” sectors within the U.S. The 
information is further separated by industry sector 
categories.4 This research focuses on the residential 
and commercial sectors. To find the average price per 
kWh for each utility, I divide the residential and 
commercial sectors’ revenue by sales. Utilities are 
represented by their state, unique utility number, year, 
and ownership type. 
The method used will consist of an OLS 
regression, which is a simple linear regression model. 
When the explanatory variable of the model (in this 
case the RPS) is correlated with the error term (the 
unobservable effects), the regression suffers from an 
endogeneity problem. To overcome this potential 
endogeneity problem, the analysis will rely on a fixed-
effect estimator to identify the unobservable effect of 
an RPS mandate on utilities’ electricity rates. It is also 
important to identify the time-invariant omitted 
characteristics and control for them to find the true 
unbiased effect that an RPS mandate has on electricity 
prices. An example of a time-invariant characteristic 
would be Nevada’s solar energy potential. Not all 
states have as many sunny days as Nevada; therefore, 
not all states could effectively use this renewable 
resource. Nevada’s solar potential also does not vary 
per year; it is a consistent state characteristic that may 
create bias results in our estimator. Tra (2015) states 
that using a group-specific fixed effect estimator will 
help to control for the problem; in this case, it will be a 
state-by-year fixed effect.  
4Categories include: total electric industry, full-service 
providers, restructured retail service providers, energy-only 
providers, and delivery-only service 
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The data set contains a total of 63,087 
observations. The number of electric utilities in this 
study is 2,622, from 1990-2017. There was a 
significant drop in utilities after 2011 from the EIA 
database, and the reason is due to an abbreviated 
version of the form to reduce the reporting burden for 
utilities. The smaller utilities are still available to 
incorporate into the data set; however, the residential 
and commercial sectors in the new files are not 
distinguishable from one another. Therefore, this drop 
of roughly 1,000 utilities after 2011 cannot be fixed, 
but it will be taken into consideration.  
Utility companies located in more than one 
state create a potential problem with the results, so they 
are dropped from the analysis. The state Iowa will also 
be dropped from the data since its RPS was 
implemented at an earlier time than what is covered in 
this analysis. The data set is unbalanced, meaning not 
every utility appears within every year observed. I 
chose not to drop utilities that disappear after a certain 
time period (from possibly closing down or merging 
with another company) because it creates a selection 
bias. This means that the only utilities included in the 
data would be those that have survived throughout the 
time-period analyzed which may skew the results.  
There are nine different types of electric 
utilities that can be found within states that may be 
subject to an RPS.5 Tra (2015) mentions that there are 
only three types of major utilities operating in all states, 
and they account for about 84 percent of all electricity 
sales. Therefore, the paper will only use data on those 
three types: investor-owned utilities, municipalities, 
and cooperatives. The DSIRE database provides 
information on variables that characterize the presence 
of an RPS, which utilities are affected by the RPS, and 
the type of energy market a state has (full deregulated 
energy market, wholesale accessibility only, retail 
choice only, or regulated market).  
The variables that will be used in the analysis 
are listed and described in Table 2. The dependent 
variable will be the average electricity price of an 
electric utility provider that operates in a state in 
residential and commercial sectors. For these 
dependent variables, the natural log will be taken to 




 Other covariates that will impact utility price 
are state characteristics that control for the diversity of 
electricity’s demand and supply across state borders, 
such as the state fuel costs. Coal and natural gas are 
substitutes to renewable energy sources; therefore, 
their price has a significant impact on electricity prices 
within RPS states. Other important characteristics 
include a state's population and population density. 
States with larger populations have a larger demand. 
 
5Including: cooperatives, facility, federal, investor-owned, 
municipals, political subdivision, power marketer, state, and 
other  
However, a higher population density will result in 
lower capital costs and electricity rates (Tra, 2015). 
These state-by-state differences will be controlled for 
by using a state-by-year fixed effects estimator.  
Since this paper will look for a consistent linear 
trend overtime for the outcomes of the regressions, the 
state-by-year fixed effects will be applied using 
continuous linear time trends (i.state#c.year). Wolfers 
(2013) conducted a study analyzing divorce laws and 
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their correlated increase in divorce rates. In order to 
account for slow-moving social and demographic 
trends within each state, Wolfers included a state-
specific linear time trend. This paper will also 
incorporate state-specific trends to control for price 
differences across states that might affect state motives 
for incorporating deregulation and RPS. One fear with 
using state-specific trends is that the results may be 
sensitive to their inclusion, creating an omitted variable 
bias (Wolfers, 2003). For this reason, each regression 
in this study will show results before and after the 
inclusion of state trends to interpret the magnitude of 
sensitivity the data may have.  
Econometric Specification: This analysis will be 
modeled after Tra’s (2015) study with the addition of 
data from 2012-2017, while also incorporating the 
deregulation of electricity markets in the model. A 
panel data set will be used for this type of analysis in 
order to control for the multiple changes within states 
over a period of time. The dependent variable in this 
study will be the natural log price of electricity from 
utilities in each state over time (Priceist), and there will 
be two separate regressions for each sector: log of 
residential price (lrpriceist) and log of commercial 
price (lcpriceist).  
This study will include a fixed-effects 
estimator. Fixed-effects (FE) assumes that all 
unobserved utility characteristics that can influence the 
adoption of an RPS are time-invariant. The model will 
incorporate utility fixed effects (FE) in every 
regression by default to capture the time-invariant 
unobserved characteristics between each utility and 
remove them from the model. This will remove the 
utility-specific effect (utilityi) from the error term and 
only leave the idiosyncratic error term. (uist). 
 
Model 
The first objective is to observe how RPS alone 
will impact prices in both the residential and the 
consumer sectors. Using the panel data set, utility 
numbers will be the panel variable while year will be 




6Tra uses state-by-year fixed effects instead of state trends; however, 
because deregulation does not vary within a state, state-by-year fixed 
effects kicks out observations in regression that include deregulation 
Equation 1. RPS Effects on all Utilities 
log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡  = 𝛼1𝑅𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 +
𝛽𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛾𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 ×
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +Φ𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡 
 
The model is linear with parameters α, β, γ, and error 
term uist. When running a regression, one of the most 
important properties is the mean-independence 
assumption. The mean-independence assumption 
ensures that the unobserved characteristics of state 
utilities that influence the dependent variable (Priceist) 
are not also correlated with the adoption of an RPS 
regulation. This is guaranteed by the random selection 
of electric utilities in the sample. If this assumption 
fails, then the entire regression will be biased. The 
idiosyncratic error term (uist) must also be 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, in this 
case RPS and deregulation, throughout all time periods 
to ensure the model avoids this issue of strict 
endogeneity. 
The error term (uist) will capture all the 
unobserved factors that are not controlled for in the 
equation. In addition, the regression will include year 
fixed effects (year) to control for national unobserved 
effects that are time-variant, ownership fixed effects 
(ownership x year) to control for time-variant 
differences among different ownership types, a state 
trend variable (state x year) to control for state 
unobserved factors that affect price trends and the 
likelihood of adopting rps or deregulation trends over 
time, the RPS dummy variable that equals 1 if affected 
by RPS, and the log of the customer count for both 
sectors to control for utility size.6 The results are listed 
below in Table 3.  
The second model will provide the primary 
results of this study. It will illustrate the effects of both 
RPS and different forms of deregulation on electricity 
rates, but this model will only include Investor-Owned 
utilities. The same fixed effects will be included with 
the exception of ownership fixed effects since only one 
ownership type will be included. The results for 
Equation 2 will be seen in Table 4. 
 
due to perfect collinearity. Regardless, trends and state-by-year fixed 
effects were able to produce similar results. 
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Equation 2. Effects of RPS and Deregulation on 
Investor-Owned Utilities 
log 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑠𝑡  = 𝛼1𝑅𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡 +
𝛼3𝑅𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑠𝑡 × 𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡 +
𝛼4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝛿𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 ×
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 +Φ𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡 
Results 
Table 3 displays the first results of RPS on all 
electric utilities in the sample. Four regressions were 
run to include both sectors with and without state 
trends. The only significant value is found in the 
residential sector with state trends; it confirms that an 
RPS does increase electricity rates by 3.2 percent. Tra 
(2015) provides similar results explaining that an RPS 
increases electricity rates by 3 percent on average. 
 
Table 3.  
Effects of RPS on All Utilities 
 
Note. Numbers represent shift in log of prices. R^2 shown is within R-squared from STATA. All results include utility-
fixed effects to control for time-varying unobservable factors. Parentheses show robust standard errors. *p-value < 0.10, 
**p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < 0.01 
 
Table 4 illustrates the estimated effects of RPS 
and deregulation on investor-owned utilities with and 
without state trends. One important observation is that 
wholesale deregulation does not seem to be as 
significant on its own. In the commercial sector, full 
deregulation lowers costs by around 5.4 percent; 
however, RPS increases costs by 6.8 percent which 
results in an overall increase of just 1.4 percent. On the 
other hand, the residential sector shows that retail and 
full deregulation offset the increase in RPS by roughly 
2 percent, leading to an overall decrease for residential 
consumers.  
 
Table 4:  
Effects of RPS and Deregulation on Investor-Owned Utilities 
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Note. Numbers represent shift in log of prices. R^2 shown is within R-squared from STATA. All results include utility-
fixed effects to control for time-varying unobservable factors. Parentheses show robust standard errors. *p-value < 0.10, 





Public policies are intended to promote general 
welfare. RPS is expected to increase electricity prices 
due to the costliness of generating renewable energy 
along with the costs of cheaper substitutes. With 
electricity prices going up with the integration of 
renewable portfolio standards, the public is likely to 
vote against the policy. However, deregulation is 
expected to increase market competition which in turn 
creates lower prices for consumers and promotes 
innovation that leads to greater efficiency. This is 
definitely the case when it comes to investor-owned 
utilities. The public is more likely to support RPS and 
its benefits towards the environment if it also lowers 
electricity prices. This support will allow policy 
makers to decrease negative externalities - like air 
pollution - in the environment while lowering costs for 
consumers. It is also interesting to note that the 
residential sector benefits more from retail and full 
deregulation than the commercial sector. Since 
corporations are expected to engage in market 
competition, it is more likely that innovation and the 
desire to maximize profits would benefit corporations 
more. The results, however, reveal the opposite. This 
makes residential consumers the target audience for the 
benefit associated with RPS and full deregulation.  
Knowledge of the potential benefits of 
combining RPS with full market competition allows 
consumers to make well informed decisions on state 
policies. The state of Nevada is among those that chose 
not to deregulate its energy markets, yet the RPS 
mandate may also be increasing its requirement within 
the next year. This could only mean that prices will 
probably increase for consumers in the residential and 
commercial sectors. The increase in electricity prices 
could be offset with full market competition, but the 
public needs to be made aware of this potential benefit.  
 
Conclusion 
Overall, implementing an RPS may lead to 
electricity price increases. Yet, states that have 
implemented retail choice or full competition have 
managed to offset these increases and not feel the 
social costs of the policy. The state of Nevada is among 
those that chose not to deregulate its energy markets, 
yet the RPS mandate may also be increasing its 
requirement within the next year. This could only mean 
that prices will increase for consumers in the 
residential and commercial sectors.  
Public policy makers should make the 
correlation between RPS and deregulation clearer for 
individuals. This will encourage voters to make more 
informed decisions on what they want and allow policy 
makers to create better policies that will counteract 
negative externalities caused by fossil fuels. When 
integrating a method that promotes environmental 
sustainability and the general welfare of the people, 
public policy will be able to resolve environmental 
concerns without the costs associated with it.   
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Appendix A: Figure 1. U.S. State Renewable Energy Initiatives 
 
 




EFFECTS OF RPS AND DEREGULATION ON ENERGY MARKETS 
 
 
Spectra Undergraduate Research Journal – 2021 – Volume 1, Issue 1 
11 
Appendix B: Figure 2. Map of RPS Policies in the U.S. 
 
 
Source: Database of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency, (DSIRE), (2018). 
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Appendix C: Table 1. RPS and Deregulation State and Year 
       
STATES RPS YEAR ACCESS TO WHOLSALE RETAIL CHOICE BOTH RETAIL AND WHOLESALE 
Alabama - AL      
Alaska - AK      
Arizona - AZ  1996    
Arkansas - AR   2004   
California - CA  2002 1998 1998 1998 
Colorado - CO  2004    
Connecticut - CT  1998 1997 2000 2000 
Delaware - DE  2005 1997 2001 2001 
Florida - FL      
Georgia - GA      
Hawaii - HI  2004    
Idaho - ID      
Illinois - IL  2007 2002 1999 2002 
Indiana - IN   2002   
Iowa - IA  1983 2002   
Kansas - KS  2009 2004   
Kentucky - KY   2002   
Louisiana - LA   2004   
Maine - ME  1997 1997 2000 2000 
Maryland - MD  2004 1997 2000 2000 
Massachusetts - MA  1997 1997 1998 1998 
Michigan - MI  2008 2002 2001 2002 
Minnesota - MN  1994 2002   
Mississippi - MS   2004   
Missouri - MO  2008 2002   
Montana - MT  2005 2002   
Nebraska - NE   2004   
Nevada - NV  1997    
New Hampshire- NH  2007 1997 1998 1998 
New Jersey - NJ  1999 1997 1999 1999 
New Mexico - NM  2000 2004   
New York - NY  2004 1999 1998 1999 
North Carolina - NC  2007 2002   
North Dakota - ND   2002   
Ohio - OH  2008 2002 2001 2002 
Oklahoma - OK   2004   
Oregon - OR  2007    
Pennsylvania - PA  1998 1997 1999 1999 
Rhode Island - RI  2004 1997 1998 1998 
South Carolina - SC      
South Dakota - SD   2002   
Tennessee - TN   1997   
Texas - TX  1999 1997 2002 2002 
Utah - UT      
Vermont - VT  2015 1997   
Virginia - VA   2002 2002 2002 
Washington - WA  2006    
West Virginia - WV   2002   
Wisconsin - WI  1998 2002   
Wyoming - WY     
  
EFFECTS OF RPS AND DEREGULATION ON ENERGY MARKETS 
 
 
Spectra Undergraduate Research Journal – 2021 – Volume 1, Issue 1 
13 
Appendix D: Table 2. Summary Statistics 
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Appendix E: Table 3: Effects of RPS on All Utilities 
       
 
Note. Numbers represent shift in log of prices. R^2 shown is within R-squared from STATA. All results include 
utility-fixed effects to control for time-varying unobservable factors. Parentheses show robust standard errors. 
*p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < 0.01 
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Appendix F: Table 4. Effects of RPS and Deregulation on Investor-Owned Utilities 
       
 
  
Note. Numbers represent shift in log of prices. R^2 shown is within R-squared from STATA. All results include 
utility-fixed effects to control for time-varying unobservable factors. Parentheses show robust standard errors. 
*p-value < 0.10, **p-value < 0.05, ***p-value < 0.01 
 
 
